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Case No. 9176 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
GLEN F. HARDING, 
Plaintiff and Appellant; 
-vs.-
l\1ARY ALLEN, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
I 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
II 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant's statement of facts are essentially correct, 
but as herein supplemented, and in some instances contro-
verted, as follows: 
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The fence existing between plaintiff's and defend-
ant's properties had existed in its then location for a 
long time prior to December 11, 1937, when defendant 
acquired her property. Transcript 7 4. 
At the tin1e of her purchase the fence extended to a 
tree approximately 10 to 12 feet east of the west property 
line of plaintiff's and defendant's property. Transcript 
14, 16, 45, 66, 67, 70, 72 and 81. 
Two separate driveways existed at the time defend-
ant purchased her property, one on either side of the 
fence line with the fence separating them. Transcript 
45. When water was piped into the defendant's hon1e a 
hydrant had been placed and continuously thereafter re-
tained on the fence line approximately 30 feet east of the 
west property line. Transcript 18, 44. 
When the crossover at the curb was constructed for 
ingress to and egress from plaintiff's and defendant's 
properties prior to 1937, the exact date being unknown, 
it was placed, so far as can be determined, exactly one-
half north of the fence line extended to the west and one-
half on the south side thereof, the center being in line with 
the fence manifestly for the convenience of the occupants 
of the two properties. Transcript 82, 86. 
If any presumption can be indulged in, the presump-
tion would be that the crossover was installed in its 
present location at the instance of the property owners 
and for their convenience, no one else would have any 
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interest therein or be served thereby. There is no evi-
dence that the owners and occupants of the property on 
either side of the fence ever interferred with the use of 
the property on the other side of the fence except one of 
plaintiff's witnesses indicated an occasional slipping over 
on to plaintiff's side slightly south of the fence line when 
the driveway was slick. That the fence line, extended 
through, as found by the trial court, and was marked by 
visible evidence such as fence, monuments, or buildings, 
when plaintiff purchased his property, is evidenced by 
the fact that in the construction of his buildings and re-
taining walls he followed through from east to west just 
slightly south of the line claimed by the defendant and 
that he himself directed or had placed one panel of fence 
to replace wire at the west end of the present terminus 
shortly after he acquired his property. Transcript 10 and 
47, defendant's Exhibit 4. Prior to that he had discussed 
the property line with one George Carsons. Transcript 
13 and 14. Plaintiff's retaining wall is a permanent con-
crete wall dug down some distance in the slope and exist-
ing approximately 3 to 3lj2 feet north of his commercial 
buildings leaving a wall or catwalk for light into base-
ment rooms. Transcript 13 and 14. 
The foundation for his garages, being permanent in 
nature, were placed continuously on a diagonal direction, 
bearing to the south following the fence line and plaintiff 
erected a fence along the south side of the property 
claimed by defendant of his own volition shortly after he 
purchased his property, i.e. in the spring of 1952, or 1953. 
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Transcript 1-1, 25, 49,' 57. Defendant's Exhibits 1, 3, 5, 6 
and 7. 
The north wall of a garage or building on the Weller 
property, in existence when plaintiff purchased his prop-
erty, and long prior thereto, was along said fence line and 
formed a part of the dividing line. Transcript31, 36, 37, 
41, 42, 46, 66, 68 and 69. 
Several years prior to plaintiff's acquisition of his 
property, in approximately 1946, the then owner of the 
east 49V2 feet, Mr. Joseph H. Hunter, plaintiff's grantor, 
knew that the fence did not follow the survey line. Plain-
tiff's predecessor took no steps to change the location of 
said fence. Subsequently defendant repaired or partly 
replaced said fence on the existing line and Hunter made 
no complaint about it. Transcript 89 and 90. 
III 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
1. THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTS THE FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND THE JUDGMENT. 
IV 
ARGUMENT 
It is the law of this state that this court will not dis-
hub the findings and order of the trial tribunal if there 
is substantial basis in the evidence to support its action, 
Teamsters, Chauffeurs and Helpers of America, Local 
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{ 'nions X o. :2~2 and No. 976, Plaintiffs, versus Board of 
Review, Deparhnent of l~mployn1ent Security, of the 
Industrial Com1nission of Ftah, et al, defendants, decided 
,J~UllUlX)' 20, 1960. 
"This court will indulge considerable credit 
to the findings of the trial court because of his ad-
vantaged position and will not disturb them unless 
the evidence clearly preponderates against the 
findings." 
Peterson vs. Holloway, 8 Ut. 2nd 328 334 P. 2d 559. 
Nathan G. Chugg vs. Dale Chugg et al., 7-20-59. 
A consideration of all the evidence in the case makes 
it clear and convincing that it was generally known that 
the fence line which has existed for more th~n 20 years 
prior to the filing of plaintiff's complaint ran on a bias 
to the south and not due east and west as shown by the 
deeds; that all of the occupants of the land on both sides 
of that fence line knew of its existence and recognized it 
as the dividing line since prior to defendant's acquisition 
of her property. There is no evidence that anyone ever 
attempted to change that dividing line. While it appears 
to be true that IIunter, plaintiff's predecessor, did not 
occupy the east 491f2 feet of plaintiff's property as a 
home, he nevertheless occupied it in the sense that he ac-
tually and actively maintained, controlled and considered 
it and shortly after acquiring it in 1946, had it surveyed. 
Something it must he assumed, about the fence line must 
have indicated to him a doubt as to the location of the 
true line because he had it surveyed and discovered then 
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that it was not on the fence line. He called ti1at fact to , 
defendant's attention but made no move or effort to 
change or relocate the fence - notwithstanding repairs 
to and replacement of parts thereof shortly thereafter 
made. And by his very actions, or failure to act, acqui-
esced in its then location.. 
His knowledge of the facts and his acquiescence 
therein are imputed to his grantee (plaintiff) Hummell 
et al vs. Young et al, 1 U t. 2nd 237, 265 P. 2d 410. The evi-
dence is conclusive that there was acquiescence in the 
fence line established for more than 20 years prior to the 
filing of this action with full knowledge that the fence 
was not upon the true line since 1946, 11 years prior to 
the filing of the suit. Hunter acquiesced by taking no 
action to change the location. His grantee, plaintiff, ac-
quiesced by installing permanent and costly construction 
completely along and immediately south of the fence 
line from east to west. l\1rs. Weller, plaintiff's prede-
cessor to the west 66 feet, acquiesced as did Spendlove, 
her predecessor, in the use and operation of the two drive-
ways, one on either side of the fence between the two 
properties down to within 10 or 12 feet of the west line 
and in the installation and use of the crossover for in-
gress to and egress from their respective properties on 
the west. 
This court said in Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205: 
"We further pointed out in Bro·wn vs l\1illiner 
Supra (232 P. 2nd 202 added) that in the absence 
of evidence that the owners of adjoining property 
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or their predecessors in interest, ever made an 
expn'~~ agreernent to the location of the boundary 
between them, if they have occupied their respec-
tive pre1nises up to an open boundary line visibly 
marked by momtments, fences or buildings for a 
long period of time and mut1tally recognized it as 
the dividing line between them. The law will imply 
an agreement fixing the boundary as located if it 
can do so consistently with the facts appearing and 
it will not pennit the parties nor their grantees to 
depart from such line." (Italics ours.) 
''This is so because the doctrine of boundary 
by acquiescence rests on sound public policy of 
avoiding trouble and litigation over boundaries." 
This rule is sometimes referred to as the doctrine 
of boundary by acquiescence. The rule is recognized and 
implied in Holmes vs Judge, 87 P. 1009, and in a long 
line of subsequent cases all cited in Brown vs. Milliner, 
120 Ut. 16, 232 Pac. (2) 202-7. Briem vs. Smith, 112 P. 
2d 145, Jensen vs. Bartlett, 4 U t. 2nd 58, 286 Pac. 2nd 
80-t. 
The court further said in the Hummell case : 
"The court in such cases indulges in the fic-
tion that at some time in the past the adjoining 
owners were in dispute or uncertain as to the 
location of the true boundary and that they settled 
their differences by agreeing upon the fence or 
other monument as the dividing line between the 
properties." 
Certainly that fiction can and should be indulged in in 
the instant case "consistently with the facts appearing:' 
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rrhere is no evidence to the contrary, and by so indulging 
in such fiction no violence will be done to any evidence. 
It seems to the writer that no other presumption could 
be reached under the evidence down to the filing of the 
action which occurred at a date 1nany years after such 
presumption arose by reason of the actions of the adjoin-
ing property owners. 
This court listed as. a requisite to acquiescence "mu-
tual recognition." Brown vs Milliner Supra. Acquies-
cence for a period of 8 years was held sufficient to satisfy 
the rule establishing fence lines as a property line in 
Ekberg vs. Bates, 239 P. 2d 205. The court saying in part: 
"In the instant case, as we have pointed out 
above, there was a period of actual acquiescence 
for more than 7 years (the Utah limitations period 
for adverse possession) before appellant's ac-
quired their title and under all the circu1nstances 
shown herein that was a sufficient length of time 
to establish the line so that appellants are pre-
cluded from claiming that it is not the true line." 
The language of this court in the case of Holmes vs. 
Judge, Supra, indicates that the presumption of an agree-
ment under the fiction of acquiescence may not be re-
butted and it is further indicated in other cases decided 
by this court that "in all cases" where the previously 
noted pre-requisites are present, a binding boundary 
agreement will be implied. True, these statements may 
be dicta but indicate the thinking of this court, Farr De-
velopment Company vs. Thomas, 41 lTt. 1. 122 P. 906, 
8 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
where quoting from the Holmes vs. Judge case Supra, 
this court said : 
"\Ye said all that is necessary to be or that 
can be said by us on the question that where own-
ers of adjoining lands have occupied the respective 
pren1ises up to a certain line which they and their 
predecessors in interest recognized or acquiesced 
in as their boundary line for a long period of time 
neither they nor their grantees or privies in estate 
will be pennitted to deny that the boundary line so 
recognized and acquiesced in is the true line of 
division between their properties." 
See also Banford vs. Eccles, 51 U 453, 126 P. 333, Young 
v. Highland, 37 Utah 229, 108 P. 1124, Moyer vs. Lang-
ton, 37 U 9, 106 P. 508. 
No good could be served now to compel the establish-
ment of a different division line. Appellant has con-
structed costly and permanent buildings and walls along 
the fence line. It would be ridiculous to suppose that he 
would go to the expense of reconstructing these buildings 
andjor walls if he should prevail in this appeal. The most 
that would be accomplished would be to save face in 
having filed the action, and to jeopardize respondent's 
property by making it impossible of ingress to and egress 
frmn and cause bitterness and bickering between the 
parties, which this court has sought to avoid. Holmes vs. 
Judge, 31 Ut. 269, 87 P. 1009, Blanchard vs: Smith, 255 
P. 2d 729. 
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v 
CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the facts 
and the law amply support the findings, conclusions and 
judgment of the trial court and that they should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HUGGINS & HUGGINS 
IRA A. HUGGINS 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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